En kritik af samtidens autenticitetsideal: En kulturkritik af det unikke i det unikkes tid
According to Andreas Reckwitz today we live in a society of singularities in which thingsthat are valorized come to be considered as being unique. These unique things Reckwitz callsa singularity. At the same time there seems to be a great many repetitions of these so-calledsingularities. In this thesis I explore the meaning of this seeming paradox of the repetition ofthe unique: How can something which claims to be unique repeat itself and what does thissay about today’s society?To explore this I try to answer three related questions: 1) How can these repetitions beunderstood in the light of the society of singularities? 2) What negative aspects of today’sideal of authenticity can be identified, and lastly: 3) Is it possible to formulate a new ideal ofauthenticity in the light of the problematic aspects identified?To answer the first questions I use Reckwitz’ book the Society of Singularities and here I findthat the many repetitions of unique “things” is due to a historical joining of the idea ofauthenticity and the unique. Today’s society is due the high standard of living obsessed withliving a meaningful life and since the idea of authenticity has been linked with the unique,life’s meaning is today sought after in a very specific, conform manner. What this joining ofthese two concepts has led to is the forming of a specific ideal of authenticity. This ideal canbe formulated in the following way: To become authentic one must interact with the unique.This leads me to the second questions where I explore the negative implications of this newideal of authenticity. To do this I start exploring the implications of these repetitions: Thesociety of the unique, can a bit paradoxically be labeled as a society of conformity. This isparadoxical if it is compared with the concept of authenticity in the works of the Danishphilosopher Søren Kierkegaard whose understanding of authenticity I introduce afterwards.After this introduction I compare this understanding of the concept of authenticity withtoday’s ideal of authenticity and find that the two are in stark contrast to each other asmentioned before. Kierkegaard insists that becoming authentic is something which one canachieve in an interaction with the self and in isolation away from “the crowd”. This is adifferent orientation from today’s ideal of authenticity that insists that authenticity is achievedby interacting with the unique as the object and in an outward-directed manner. But today’sideal of authenticity is not only in contrast to Kierkegaard’s understanding of authenticity. Iargue in the following section that it also puts the individual in a situation of increased risk ofdepression. I end this part of the analysis with a section where I summarize and evaluate thetwo understandings of authenticity. I do this by comparing the two understandings ofauthenticity with a specific definition of the word authenticity, that understands the conceptas meaning becoming aligned with an essence of the self. When making this comparison itbecomes clear that today’s ideal of authenticity in many ways is insufficient. Not only does itput the individual in an increased risk for depression, but also for certain mental states thathaunts individuals of today. These are, besides depression, feelings of FOMO (Fear ofmissing out), shame, inadequacy and stress, and all of these are due to the outwardness andthe object of today’s ideal of authenticity.In the end I conclude that Kierkegaard is right when he stresses that authenticity is achievedwith the self as the object, but that both the kierkegaardian and today’s ideal of authenticityboth are somewhat correct in the orientations, and that they in an ideal situation would seekout each other to find a golden mean between the two when it comes to their orientation.To answer the last question presented above I start with defending the use of authenticity in asociological thesis by refuting parts of Theodor Adorno’s critique of the concept. Thiscritique is not only needed to defend the thesis and its subject (Authenticity) but it also makesit possible to get a better understanding of the nature of authenticity. According to Adorno theself is constructed and as a consequence “fluid”. But when discussing this matter using theexample of a transgender person, a mix between social constructivism and realism and thetheories of Adorno and Pierre Bourdieu one can see that the self is both “fluid” and “solid”. Itherefore characterize the ideal of authenticity for the future as having a special nature ofbeing between essence and social construct. Furthermore I point out, in accordance withwhat I found out in previous parts of the thesis, that a future ideal of authenticity must havethe self as object, and with regard to its orientation must find a golden mean between theoutwardness of the reckwitzian and the inwardness of kierkegaardian understanding ofauthenticity.My approach to working with this problem is to take inspiration from a mix of critical realismand social constructivism under the heading “realistic constructivism”. Furthermore I workwith a theoretical approach, by which I mean that I work primarily using different theories todiscuss the problem without using empirical data such as interviews and observations. Insteadthe empirical data used in the thesis consists mostly of observations at the everyday level, andthese act as examples of something more broad and general.