According to Universal Moral Error Theory (UMET), all moral propositions are false –
or, on some formulations of the theory, lack a truth value. In recent years, something of a
niche literature has sprung up, which addresses the question of what do with moral
discourse if UMET is true. This is the “What Next?” Question, also known as the “Now
What?” Problem. The “Now What?” Problem looks to be hypothetical in structure: either
UMET is true or it isn’t, and if it is true, then a workable solution to the “Now What?”
Problem would appear to be desirable. However, this hypothetical structure is somewhat
misleading: some proposed solutions to the “Now What?” Problem, I argue, are of
dubious consistency with their own error theoretical motivations, and this points towards
a powerful objection to moral error theory. So the “Now What?” Problem really is a
problem for UMET, and its difficulty has been underestimated by some commentators.
The objection to which all this points is the objection from loss. This objection is
essentially is that ethical discourse is practically indispensable, and for that reason cannot
be targeted by an error theory of universal scope. This is different to David Enoch’s
indispensability argument, which aims to demonstrate the existence of robustly real
metanormative properties. The objection from loss does not establish realism. All it
establishes is that UMET is false. The success of the objection from loss is to be explained
by a tension within the error theory to which the shortcomings of some proposed solutions
to the “Now What?” Problem point – namely, the tension between the need for UMET proponents to convict morality a particular concrete error (or a collection of concrete
errors), and the presentation of this version of moral error theory as having universal
scope.