Goal of this present work is to investigate the effect of different sources of social comparison on people’s tendency to maximize their payoff when facing ambiguous situations. Based on social comparison processes theory (Festinger, 1954) and on its more recent developments (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002; Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006, Garcia & Tor, 2007), three experiments were built with the goal of manipulating participants’ social status compared to similar others. To this purpose, I adopted two different ways to communicate participants’ information about their standing. Experiment 1 adopts aggregate feedback and compares the tendency to take advantage of ambiguous situations, namely, scenarios in which it was possible to select among different payoffs, between participants scoring consistently above and below the average score of a reference group. Building on Experiment 1, Experiment 2 adopts relative feedback (ranking), and compares the economic behavior of participants’ ranking consistently second-best to that of participants ranking second-last within a group of five students. Lastly, Experiment 3, built on the previous two experiments, directly compares aggregate and relative feedback among participants ranking above the average and always in first position. Furthermore, Experiment 3 tests a possible mediator of the relationship between different feedback and participants’ tendency to maximize their earnings. To summarize, the results emerged across the three experiments demonstrate that when information about specific others’ performance is not provided, participants ranking above the average exploit ambiguous situations to a lower extent compared to participants scoring below the average (Experiment 1). Yet, when precise and detailed information about individuals’ positions within a group is specified (ranking), aggregate sources of comparisons are no longer taken into account. Participants always in second position and in fourth position (Experiment 2), not only exploited ambiguous trials, but also exhibited unethical behavior to increase their total payoff. Lastly, Experiment 3 explains how participants ranking always first and above the average differ in their tendency to maximize their earnings. The contribution of this work is twofold. On the one hand, it extends literature on social comparisons (Festinger, 1954) and rankings (Garcia et al., 2006) in the economic domain, showing that different source of feedback prompts not only competition but also the exploitation of grey areas. On the other hand, the results described in the three experiments suggest that identify the correct way to communicate performances is important and represents a delicate factor, that if not used appropriately can foster negative behaviors within groups and organizations.