This thesis, situated within the historiography of humanitarianism, seeks to explain how humanitarian evacuation came to be viewed as a solution to problems of civilian protection during crises, and how the US and UK, who evacuated the greatest number of civilians during the 20th century, instrumentalized evacuation to further their geostrategic goals. Four cases studies focus on major evacuations of the 20th century that illustrate how evacuation became a tool of both civilian protection and international relations. Spotlighting the nexus between military actors and non-governmental organisations, the case studies critically explore the motives of evacuators, the rationale they presented to the public, and the outcomes of the evacuation projects.

While recognizing that states have mixed motives for their humanitarian operations, I claim that all evacuations essentially signify a series of political failures, and that in cases where the US and UK were aggressors and rescuers, they spun their failures into narratives of rescue and redemption. In this way, I argue, the militaristic state strategically communed itself with its victims, blurring the distinctions between aggressor and victim in service to a hegemonic rescue narrative in an attempt to limit criticism in order to defend national prestige and bolster geostrategic endeavours.

In illustrating these points across the use of state-led humanitarian evacuation through four case studies, this thesis makes an original contribution to the field of humanitarian history by offering a new interpretation of humanitarian evacuation that gives insight into relationships between repressive and ideological state apparatuses within a humanitarian context. I contend that state and NGO performances of hegemonic rescue narratives strengthen state apparatuses through the reproduction of American and British foundational national myths and in turn relations of power.